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Bodily self-consciousness consists of one’s sense of agency (I am causing an action) and
body ownership (my body belongs to me). Both stem from the temporal congruence
between different modalities, although some visuomotor temporal incongruence is
acceptable for agency. To examine the association or dissociation between agency
and body ownership in the context of different temporal sensitivities, we applied a
temporal recalibration paradigm, in which subjective synchrony between asynchronous
hand action and its visual feedback can be perceived after exposure to the asynchronous
visuomotor stimulation. In the experiment, participants continuously clasped and
unclasped their hand while watching an online video of their hand that was presented
with delays of 50, 110, 170, 230, 290, and 350 ms. Then, they rated a video of their hand
with a delay of 50 ms (test stimulus) with respect to the synchrony between hand action
and hand video and the perceived agency over the video. Moreover, proprioceptive
drift of participants’ hand location toward the hand video during the exposure was
measured as an index of illusory body ownership. Results indicated that perception
of agency emerged over the delayed hand video as subjective visuomotor synchrony
was recalibrated, but that body ownership did not emerge for the delayed video, even
after the recalibration. We suggest that there is a dissociation between agency and body
ownership following visuomotor temporal recalibration.
Keywords: bodily self-consciousness, action, voluntary movement, proprioceptive drift, sensorimotor processing,
time perception, lag adaptation
Introduction
As time is a form of one’s inner sense and self-intuition (Kant, 1781), subjective time has a
close connection with our conscious experience, for instance, recognition of the simultaneity
between different sensory events and the passage of time. Since time perception arises from
acting on and perceiving the external world through our own body, the consciousness of our own
actions and body might be shaped by subjective time (Haggard, 2005; Tsakiris et al., 2007). It has
been proposed that bodily self-consciousness consists of the following two main components:
sense of agency and sense of body ownership (Gallagher, 2000; Tsakiris, 2010). Sense of
agency refers to the feeling that I am causing an action and controlling my body (Gallagher, 2000),
Abbreviations: ANOVA, analysis of variance; RHI, rubber hand illusion; SD, standard deviation.
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while sense of body ownership refers to the feeling that my body
belongs to me (Tsakiris, 2010). Both components are based on
temporal congruence among afferent information that is sourced
via different modalities (Haggard, 2005; Tsakiris, 2010).
Sense of Agency and Body Ownership in Terms
of Time
Achieving a sense of agency requires not only voluntary action
(Blakemore et al., 1998; Haggard et al., 2002) but also temporal
contiguity between the action and outcome (Blakemore et al.,
1999; Bays et al., 2005). The internal forward model in the central
motor system has been adopted to help explain the origin of
agency based on sensorimotor processes (Wolpert et al., 1995;
Wolpert, 1997; Frith et al., 2000). This model is based on an
efference copy of motor commands from a self-produced action
(von Holst andMittelstaedt, 1950) and predicts sensory feedback
of the motor commands before actual afferent feedback. If this
prediction mismatches the feedback because of temporal biases,
perceived agency will decrease. Thus, delayed visual feedback
following voluntary action is hard to attribute to the self (Franck
et al., 2001; Asai and Tanno, 2007b; Farrer et al., 2008). Further,
an outcome that can be perceived to precede the action is
also difficult to attribute to the self (Rohde et al., 2014; Timm
et al., 2014), since action commonly precedes sensory outcome
(Wegner and Wheatley, 1999). However, a certain amount of
temporal discrepancy between voluntary action and its sensory
feedback can be acceptable for perceiving a sense of agency (Bays
et al., 2005; Miyazaki and Hiraki, 2006; Asai and Tanno, 2007b).
Studies utilizing the rubber hand illusion (RHI) suggest that
sense of body ownership is based on temporal contiguity between
visuotactile afferent inputs (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998; Tsakiris
and Haggard, 2005; Tsakiris et al., 2006) and is spatially plastic,
that is, observers can perceive body ownership even toward an
external object that is separate from their own body. In the RHI,
observers watch a rubber hand being stroked, while their own
unseen hand is being synchronously stroked for a short time,
and start to feel as if the rubber hand belongs to their own
body. Consequently, the RHI will not occur when these strokes
are applied asynchronously. In addition, the misattribution of
body ownership to the rubber hand can be accompanied by a
shift of the proprioceptively felt location of the observers’ hand
toward the rubber hand. This shift, known as proprioceptive
drift (e.g., Botvinick and Cohen, 1998), can serve as an implicit
measure of body ownership and has also been observed in an
active version of the RHI when induced by the observers’ physical
hand action and its visual feedback on a video screen (Tsakiris
et al., 2006). Although the interpretation of this active RHI is still
controversial because of the co-occurrence of agency and body
ownership under proprioceptive drift (Sanchez-Vives et al., 2010;
Kalckert and Ehrsson, 2012), body ownership would inhabit
temporally matching sensations among different modalities,
including the motor domain (Tsakiris, 2010; Asai, 2015a).
Temporal Plasticity in Agency and Body
Ownership
While previous studies have suggested that both agency and body
ownership are innately acquired through congruent temporal
matching between modalities, human time perception is known
to be plastic. An example of plasticity of time perception is
the temporal recalibration, whereby observers exposed to a time
lag between bimodal stimuli show a shift in their subjective
simultaneity perception between these asynchronous stimuli
(Fujisaki et al., 2004; Vroomen et al., 2004). This plasticity should
play a key role in compensation for cross-modal latencies, which
result from the different neural processing times required by
different modalities (Spence and Squire, 2003). The temporal
recalibration is also found in visuomotor (Stetson et al., 2006)
and audiomotor domains (Heron et al., 2009). These couplings
between modalities are especially related to sense of agency, as
mentioned above.
Does temporal recalibration, in turn, lead to plasticity in
agency and body ownership? Body ownership might not be
temporally calibrated or learned, since it is widely accepted that
asynchronous visuotactile stimulation for even a few minutes
does not elicit the RHI (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998; Tsakiris
and Haggard, 2005; Tsakiris et al., 2006; Kalckert and Ehrsson,
2012); however, this is controversial because of a proposal that
body ownership can be affected by temporally incongruent
visuotactile stimulation (Shimada et al., 2009, 2014). On the other
hand, some studies have indicated that agency is temporally
plastic, that is, sense of agency can be experienced when learned
prediction of the sensory outcome of an actionmatches the actual
outcome (Frith et al., 2000; Blakemore et al., 2002; Bays et al.,
2005). Repeatedly experiencing a sensory outcome following an
action causes the learning of action–outcome associations in
terms of contextual and temporal congruence. As an example
of a contextual association, observers can learn to anticipate
a tone with a certain pitch that is triggered by a self-initiated
keypress (Elsner and Hommel, 2001) and consequently perceive
a sense of agency over the tone (Sato and Yasuda, 2005). As an
example of a temporal association, Asai and Tanno (2007a), it
was suggested that a delay between an action and its feedback
can be learned and become acceptable for generating the sense
of agency, while there were no learning effects in relation to
detection of the delay. Recent studies have suggested that it is
hard to perceive a sense of agency over the tone in the context of
audiomotor temporal recalibration in which self-initiated sounds
are subjectively perceived as preceding keypresses (Timm et al.,
2014). Moreover, Keetels and Vroomen (2012) demonstrated a
visuomotor temporal recalibration between finger tap and the
video of the hand, although this action in a natural situation does
not entail delayed visual feedback. However, these authors did
not directly examine sense of agency.
Association and Dissociation between Agency
and Body Ownership
Although it can be assumed that visuomotor temporal
recalibration modulates sense of agency but not body ownership,
how temporal recalibration between a voluntary action and its
visual feedback retains a sense of agency and body ownership
remains unclear.
While both agency and body ownership are necessary for
self-recognition (van den Bos and Jeannerod, 2002), it has been
suggested that the two are both associated and dissociated. The
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active RHI suggests an association, in which voluntary action
accompanying a sense of agency integrates distinct body parts
into a coherent sense of body ownership (Tsakiris et al., 2006).
Other studies applied the active RHI paradigm to compare its
effects under conditions with and without agency (e.g., active vs.
passive movements) and to investigate the interaction between
sense of agency and body ownership (Kalckert and Ehrsson,
2012, 2014a,b; Braun et al., 2014; Asai, 2015a). Recent studies
have suggested that sense of agency can override body ownership
(Tsakiris et al., 2007), that is, agency over a moving hand image
itself generates body ownership toward the image even when
there is asynchrony between them (Asai, 2015a).
In contrast, sense of agency and body ownership can be
dissociated not only conceptually (Gallagher, 2000; Tsakiris,
2010) and neurally (Tsakiris et al., 2010) but also in terms of
spatiotemporal factors. Since the spatial component of visual
feedback plays a more crucial role than the temporal component
does in eliciting a sense of agency (Farrer et al., 2008), a certain
amount of delay of visual feedback could be acceptable for
eliciting agency (Bays et al., 2005; Miyazaki and Hiraki, 2006;
Asai and Tanno, 2007b). Body ownership, however, requires
temporal congruence between inter-sensory stimuli (Botvinick
and Cohen, 1998; Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005).
Present Study
To date, no studies have examined how the temporal component
of an action and its feedback modulates sense of agency and
body ownership, respectively and simultaneously. This might
be because voluntary action always entails both agency and
body ownership (Tsakiris, 2010). To address this gap in the
literature, we attempted to dissociate agency and body ownership
by taking advantage of their different sensitivity to temporal
factors, that is, agency allows a relatively broad time window
of asynchrony (e.g., Bays et al., 2005) while body ownership
does not (e.g., Botvinick and Cohen, 1998). To achieve this, we
applied a temporal recalibration paradigm, involving observers
recalibrating an asynchrony between their hand action and its
visual feedback (Keetels and Vroomen, 2012).
Our two hypotheses regarding dissociation of agency and
body ownership were as follows: First, observers will perceive
sense of agency over delayed visual feedback of their hand action
after visuomotor temporal recalibration. Second, observers will
not perceive illusory body ownership toward the delayed visual
feedback even after the visuomotor temporal recalibration,
because the recalibration does not entail body ownership unless
it is elicited by agency.
To test these hypotheses, we conducted an experiment in
which participants were exposed to an online video of their hand
action with six levels of delay (adaptation stimulus). Then, they
rated a hand video with the shortest delay (test stimulus) with
respect to the synchrony between hand action and video and the
perceived agency over the video. Moreover, proprioceptive drift
toward the video image was used as a measure of shift of body
ownership during the adaptation phase.
We expected that a greater delay of the adaptation
stimulus would result in a stronger temporal recalibration and,
consequently, lower ratings of synchrony and agency over the
test stimulus, which would be perceived as illusorily preceding
the actual hand action. On the other hand, proprioceptive drift
was expected to emerge in relation to the adaptation stimulus
with minimal delay, but not in relation to delayed adaptation
stimuli, because it can be assumed that temporal recalibration
does not affect body ownership. Conversely, if temporal
recalibration affects body ownership because agency overrides
body ownership, substantial proprioceptive drift should be found
under all conditions, regardless of the magnitude of adaptation-
stimulus delay.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Nineteen adults (15 females; mean age 33.21 ± 6.21 years),
naïve with respect to the study purpose, participated in
return for monetary compensation. All were self-declared right-
handed and had normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity
and no neurological or psychiatric illness. Written informed
consent was obtained from each participant. This study was
approved by the ethical committee of the NTT Communication
Science Laboratories and was conducted in accordance with the
principles of the Declaration of Helsinki.
Experimental Setup
The setup (see Figures 1A,B), in which visual feedback of
participants’ hand action was provided with and without delay,
followed that of previous study which examined active RHI
(Asai, 2015a). Participants sat at a table in a semi-dark and quiet
room. Their left hand was put on a wrist rest at the edge of
the table to prevent the wrist from moving from side to side
during the hand action. The distance between the center of the
left wrist and the center of participants’ body was approximately
40 cm. The left hand was covered with a white glove to remove
morphological cues for self-identification. The dorsum of the left
hand was recorded by a color video camera (STC-TC33USB-
AS, Sensor Technologies America, Inc.) at 60 frames per second,
from 37.5 cm directly above the hand. The tabletop was covered
with a black cloth so that the camera captured the hand against
a black background. An LED light (LE-H631B, Twinbird Corp.)
illuminated the space near the left hand. We targeted the left
hand, following previous typical RHI studies (e.g., Botvinick and
Cohen, 1998), because it has been suggested that there is a right-
hemispheric dominance for body ownership and a stronger RHI
effect for the left hand (Ocklenburg et al., 2011).
A program written with Hot Soup Processor version 3.31
(ONION Software) generated video images of the left hand with
systematic delays (50, 110, 170, 230, 290, or 350 ms; all including
intrinsic transmission delay). The minimum 50-ms delay can
be accepted as synchronous feedback because this is below
the 150 ms threshold of detecting visuomotor delays (Tsakiris
et al., 2006, 2010; Longo and Haggard, 2009). The filmed images
were processed and simultaneously displayed on a 23-inch LED
monitor (i2353Ph, AOC) with a resolution of 1920× 1080 pixels
and a refresh rate of 60 Hz. A computer (CF-SX1, Panasonic
Corp.) with the above program running on Windows 7 was used
to control image processing, stimulus presentation, and response
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FIGURE 1 | Experimental setup, depicted in (A) elevated and (B)
horizontal views. In the actual experiment, a black cloth covered the tabletop
and participants wore a black cape covering the left arm and shoulder.
collection. The monitor was laid on the table in front of the
participants, at approximately 45 cm from the head. The hand
image appeared to be almost life-sized on the monitor and was
displaced approximately 18 cm rightward from the center of the
left wrist. This displacement should be acceptable for inducing
proprioceptive drift since the spatial limit in this regard has been
reported as 30 cm (Lloyd, 2007). To obstruct the direct view of
the left hand and arm, participants placed the left hand behind a
black standing screen aligned with the mid-sagittal plane on the
table, and wore a black cape covering the left arm and shoulder.
A loudspeaker built into the monitor presented an auditory
metronome with alternate high and low pure tones (100 beats
per minute), in order to have all participants enact and view the
same number of hand movements.
During proprioceptive drift measurement, as described below,
participants indicated the felt horizontal location of their left
wrist by moving from side to side with the right hand a
transparent rod positioned before their eyes, which was attached
to the arrowhead of digital Vernier calipers (CD-30C, Mitutoyo
Corp.). The calipers were attached to a standing screen to
the front and left of the participants, at a height of 36 cm.
The distance between the point of the arrowhead and the
top of participants’ left wrist was approximately 27 cm. The
participants could not see any cues for the hand location, such
as numbers and marks; however, the experimenter could see
numbers indicating the location of the arrowhead in units of 0.01
mm. Larger numbers indicated a location closer to the center of
the body. This apparatus (Asai, 2015b) allows for more minute
measurement of proprioceptive drift compared to asking the felt
hand location by pointing using the opposite hand (Botvinick
and Cohen, 1998) or verbally reporting a number on a ruler
(Tsakiris et al., 2006), which have been traditionally used.
Procedures
The experiment consisted of three blocks, in which participants
performed synchrony rating, agency rating, or proprioceptive
location-judgment tasks (Figures 2A,B). Each of the three tasks
was based on a common procedure comprising adaptation
and test phases and involving continuous left-hand action, as
described below. The order of the blocks was counterbalanced
across participants. The inter-block interval was approximately
an hour and a half. Participants performed an unrelated filler
task during the interval in order to obstruct potential carry-over
effects.
The common procedure started with the metronome to
cue the continuous clasping and unclasping of participants’
left hand at 0.83 Hz, triggered by participants’ pressing the
enter key with their right hand. The participants viewed
the monitor throughout the task. For the first 4,800 ms,
the monitor presented a black screen while the participant
clasped and unclasped the left hand. For the next 40,000
ms, the video image of the left hand with one of the six
delays (50–350 ms) was presented (adaptation stimulus). Finally,
the left-hand image with a 50-ms delay was presented for
1,200 ms without the metronome (test stimulus), preceded by
a 600-ms black screen. During the test stimulus period, the
participants were instructed to keep the same pace without
the metronome, in order to avoid introducing the cue of
the temporal proximity between test stimulus and left-hand
movement, which might counteract the recalibration effect.
When the test stimulus period ended, participants stopped the
hand movement and the monitor presented questions and/or
instructions regarding each task. The inter-trial interval was
5,000 ms in all blocks.
In the synchrony rating task, the participants performed the
common procedure once, then answered the following question
by pressing number keys (1–9), corresponding to a 9-point Likert
scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 9 (extremely): ‘‘To what
extent did you feel that the motion of the hand image presented
just before was incongruent with your hand movement?’’ The
question and scale were presented on the monitor until the
keypress was made. The synchrony rating task block consisted
of 2 practice and 18 main trials (three repetitions of each of six
adaptation-stimulus delay conditions), in which the order of the
delay conditions was randomized.
The agency rating task was identical to the synchrony rating
task, except for the following difference. The monitor presented
the question ‘‘To what extent did you feel that the hand image
presented just before was your hand?’’ At the beginning of
this block, we gave participants the instruction regarding the
question: ‘‘Answer the question in view of whether themovement
of the hand image can be felt as self- or other-controlled,
although the image was of the participant’s hand.’’
The proprioceptive location-judgment task consisted of pre-
test proprioceptive location judgment, the common procedure,
and post-test location judgment. In the pre-test judgment,
participants had their eyes open and were asked to indicate
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FIGURE 2 | Schematic illustration of (A) synchrony or agency rating task and (B) proprioceptive location-judgment task. Musical notes indicate periods
with an auditory metronome.
the proprioceptively felt location of the center of their unseen
left wrist by looking at and moving the arrowhead of the
calipers with no time constraint. At this time, the hand image
on the monitor was outside the participants’ visual field.
The experimenter recorded the location indicated on a digital
display of the calipers. This location judgment was repeated
twice for precise measurement, before the common procedure
was completed once. The participants were instructed not to
intentionally shift the left wrist location during adaptation-
stimulus and test-stimulus periods. Immediately after the
test-stimulus presentation, at the end of the common procedure,
post-test location judgment was performed in the same manner
as that of the pre-test. The block with the location judgment-
task consisted of 2 practice and 12 main trials (two repetitions
of each six adaptation-stimulus delay), in which the order of
the delay conditions was randomized. Proprioceptive drift was
calculated by subtracting the mean of two pre-test judgments
from that of the post-test judgments. A positive value of the drift
indicated that illusory body ownership transferred to the hand
image.
Data Analysis
For consistency of synchrony and agency ratings, the synchrony
rating score was reversed so that a score of 1 (not at all
feeling that the motion of test stimulus was incongruent with
the hand movement) was transformed to 9. Synchrony and
agency ratings and proprioceptive drift in each delay condition
were averaged separately for each participant. Statistical analyses
were performed using SPSS version 22.0 (IBM Corp.), with the
significance level set at p< 0.05.
A simple regression analysis with adaptation-stimulus delay
as an independent variable and synchrony rating, agency
rating, and proprioceptive drift as dependent variables was
conducted to examine whether adaptation-stimulus delay
predicts the synchrony and agency ratings for test stimulus
and proprioceptive drift toward the hand image. We reported
non-adjusted coefficient of determination (R2) and standardized
partial regression coefficient (β) and tested the significance of the
slope of regression by t test. If temporal recalibration emerges
and leads to agency, as proposed in the first hypothesis, there
will be negative regression slopes for the synchrony and agency
ratings, indicating that larger adaptation-stimulus delay results
in a stronger temporal recalibration and, consequently, lower
synchrony and agency ratings for the stimulus with minimal
delay. On the other hand, if temporal recalibration does not lead
to body ownership, as proposed in the second hypothesis, there
will also be a negative regression slope for proprioceptive drift,
indicating that proprioceptive drift does not emerge in relation
to delayed adaptation stimuli.
For the case that the second hypothesis was supported, we
examined the conditions in which proprioceptive drift occurred
by one-tailed t tests to confirm whether the proprioceptive drift
in each delay condition was higher than zero. The effect size was
reported as r (Cohen, 1988).
For further testing, we performed an ANOVA for synchrony
rating, agency rating, and proprioceptive drift to reveal the effect
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of delay (six adaptation-stimulus delays) and the differences
between conditions. For these ANOVAs, the Huynh-Feldt
correction was applied to the degrees of freedom when
the sphericity assumption was violated. The effect size was
reported as η2 (Cohen, 1988). Dunnett’s multiple comparisons
were performed on synchrony rating, agency rating, and
proprioceptive drift to compare the minimum 50-ms delay
condition with the other five conditions in order to examine how
much delay is crucial for visuomotor temporal recalibration.
Finally, we calculated Pearson’s product-moment correlation
coefficients (r) for the relationships between synchrony rating,
agency rating, and proprioceptive drift. These correlations
examined the concurrence of temporal recalibration, sense of
agency, and body ownership.
Results
Six participants were excluded from the analysis. Five failed
to experience any visuomotor temporal recalibration, because
each of their mean synchrony ratings across conditions were
1 standard deviation (SD) above the mean across participants
(mean = 7.62, SD = 1.24), indicating a rating of 9 (strong feeling
of congruence between test stimulus and hand action) for almost
all trials. One participant showed a highly positive slope of the
linear regression of agency ratings that was 1 SD above the
mean across participants (mean = −0.19, SD = 0.42), indicating
increased agency ratings for longer delays after the recalibration
possibly due to misunderstanding the task.
Figure 3 depicts the results of synchrony rating. The
regression analysis revealed that adaptation-stimulus delay
significantly explained synchrony rating, R2 = 0.14, β = −0.39,
t(77) = 3.45, p < 0.01. The ANOVA revealed a significant main
effect of delay on synchrony rating, F(1.66,19.94) = 4.56, p < 0.05,
η2 = 0.28. Multiple comparisons revealed that synchrony ratings
were significantly decreased under the 350-ms delay condition
relative to the 50-ms delay (p< 0.05).
Figure 4 depicts the results of agency rating. The regression
analysis revealed that adaptation-stimulus delay significantly
explained agency rating, R2 = 0.05, β = −0.28, t(77) = 2.03, p <
0.05. The ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of delay on
agency rating, F(2.98,35.72) = 3.39, p< 0.05, η2 = 0.22.
Figure 5 depicts the results of proprioceptive drift. The
regression analysis revealed that adaptation-stimulus delay did
not explain proprioceptive drift, R2 = 0.05, β = −0.22, t(77) =
1.95, p = 0.06. The ANOVA revealed no main effect of delay
on proprioceptive drift, F(5,60) = 1.30, p = 0.28, η2 = 0.10.
However, post hoc t tests confirmed that proprioceptive drift
was significantly higher than zero under 50- and 110-ms delay
conditions (50 ms: t(12) = 2.60, p < 0.05, r = 0.60; 110 ms: t(12) =
2.28, p < 0.05, r = 0.55) but not under the other conditions, ts <
0.83, ps > 0.43, rs< 0.24.
As for the correlations between synchrony rating, agency
rating, and proprioceptive drift, we found a significantly positive
correlation between synchrony and agency ratings (Pearson’s
r(78) = 0.44, p < 0.01), whereas there were no correlations with
proprioceptive drift (synchrony and drift: r(78) = 0.15, p = 0.20;
agency and drift: r(78) = 0.11, p = 0.33).
FIGURE 3 | Synchrony ratings for test stimulus with the 50-ms delay in
relation to mean ratings as a function of adaptation-stimulus delay
with a significant regression line. A higher rating means a stronger
subjective synchrony between participants’ hand action and the hand image.
Error bars denote ±1 standard error of the mean. Asterisk indicates a
significant difference between conditions (*p < 0.05).
FIGURE 4 | Agency ratings for test stimulus with the 50-ms delay in
relation to mean ratings as a function of adaptation-stimulus delay
with a significant regression line. A higher rating means a stronger sense
of agency over the hand image. Error bars denote ±1 standard error of the
mean.
Discussion
Summary of Results
The present study examined sense of agency and body ownership
in relation to one’s own hand image following temporal
recalibration between physical hand action and the hand image,
with temporal discrepancy varying between 50 and 350 ms. Our
results indicated two main findings.
First, participants had difficulty in perceiving synchrony
for the synchronous visual feedback of hand action following
exposure to the delayed visual feedback. Our results revealed that
the magnitude of temporal discrepancy between hand action and
hand image (adaptation stimulus) predicted perceived synchrony
between hand action and hand image with the minimal delay
Frontiers in Integrative Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 6 May 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 35
Imaizumi and Asai Temporal recalibration and bodily self-consciousness
FIGURE 5 | Proprioceptive drift as a function of adaptation-stimulus
delay. Error bars denote ±1 standard error of the mean. Asterisks indicate
values that are significantly different from zero (*p < 0.05).
(test stimulus) after the adaptation phase, although this specific
difference was found only between synchrony ratings under
the 50- and 350-ms delay conditions. These findings suggest
the occurrence of a visuomotor temporal recalibration similar
to a recent study reporting temporal recalibration between
finger taps and their video image (Keetels and Vroomen, 2012).
Furthermore, our regression analysis indicated that adaptation-
stimulus delay also predicted agency over the hand image with
the minimal delay, suggesting that sense of agency over the
synchronous hand image decreased with temporal recalibration
in a similar manner to the perceived synchrony. Recently, a shift
of the criterion for judging agency has been reported to occur in
the same manner as that for temporal order judgment following
audiomotor temporal recalibration (Timm et al., 2014). In
principle, following temporal recalibration, observers illusorily
perceive the outcome as that preceding the action (Stetson et al.,
2006). Therefore, we speculate that because our participants were
likely to perceive the preceding video image of their own hand
after temporal recalibration, they consequently had difficulty in
attributing the hand image to the self (Rohde et al., 2014). Taken
together, our results extend previous findings by suggesting that
the visuomotor temporal recalibration in voluntary action entails
a recalibration of sense of agency over one’s own body.
Second, our results indicated that proprioceptive drift was not
predicted by adaptation-stimulus delay and occurred only under
50- and 110-ms delay conditions, suggesting that proprioceptive
drift emerged only in the context of synchronously moving visual
feedback, regardless of visuomotor temporal recalibration. In
addition, the results showed no correlation of proprioceptive
drift with either synchrony or agency rating. These results
suggest that visuomotor temporal recalibration does not entail
recalibration of body ownership toward the external object (i.e.,
video image of the hand), as we hypothesized. In line with
previous RHI studies (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998; Tsakiris and
Haggard, 2005), our participants did not show proprioceptive
drift toward an asynchronously moving image of their hand
action (i.e., adaptation stimulus with 170- to 350-ms delay).
However, the proprioceptive drift was found under 50- and 110-
ms delay conditions probably because these delay values of the
video image were below 150 ms and acceptable for attributing
the video image to the self (Blakemore et al., 1999; Franck et al.,
2001; Longo and Haggard, 2009).
Dissociation between Agency and Body
Ownership
Our two main findings suggest a dissociation between sense of
agency and body ownership following temporal recalibration.
This seems reasonable in the light of previous studies that
separately examined agency and body ownership and showed
that agency varies with temporal recalibration (Timm et al.,
2014), while body ownership is disrupted on a continuous basis
by asynchronous stimulation (e.g., Botvinick and Cohen, 1998).
In contrast, other studies have suggested that, in a situation
without temporal recalibration, agency itself can elicit body
ownership (e.g., Asai, 2015a). However, given that in the present
study, proprioceptive drift did not emerge under conditions
with a 170-ms or larger adaptation-stimulus delay, while there
was perception of agency under these conditions, it can be
assumed that agency cannot override body ownership following
temporal recalibration. We speculate that this dissociation may
stem from distinct neural networks underlying the independence
model (Tsakiris et al., 2010), which posits that agency and body
ownership are qualitatively different. On the other hand, it can
also be said that the dissociation comes from differences in the
extent to which agency and body ownership depend on temporal
congruence for their emergence. Some visuomotor temporal
incongruence is acceptable for sense of agency (approximately
380 ms: Rohde et al., 2014; 500 ms: Asai and Tanno, 2007b; 1,000
ms: Miyazaki and Hiraki, 2006), while body ownership allows
shorter inter-sensory temporal incongruence (e.g., Botvinick and
Cohen, 1998; Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005; Tsakiris et al., 2006;
for exceptions, see also Shimada et al., 2009, 2014), perhaps
because agency can emerge during a conceptual evaluation stage
even when substantial sensorimotor temporal incongruence
prevents the self-attribution of sensory feedback for action
(Synofzik et al., 2008). Thus, agency can flexibly emerge based
on the subjective time window, even if subjective visuomotor
synchrony has been illusorily recalibrated. Conversely, body
ownership may reject physical temporal incongruence based on
sensorimotor processing regardless of temporal recalibration.
Further investigation will be needed to understand the origin of
this dissociation.
Individual Differences in Temporal Recalibration
Why did five of our participants not show evidence of temporal
recalibration? Although a previous study has demonstrated
individual differences in the temporal distance between
audiovisual stimuli required for the subjective synchrony under
a situation without temporal recalibration (Stone et al., 2001),
there has been, to our knowledge, no evidence of individual
differences in the adaptation to asynchrony between bimodal
stimuli (i.e., temporal recalibration). One possible explanation
for the results of these five participants may come from
individual differences in monitoring of the action (Fourneret
and Jeannerod, 1998) revealed by using a traditional line-
drawing task (Nielsen, 1963), in which observers trace sagittal
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lines on a tablet with their hand using a stylus. The hand was
hidden by a mirror, in which they viewed the lines, which either
corresponded to or were biased away from the actual trajectory.
Fourneret and Jeannerod (1998) showed that some participants
misperceived the direction of their hand movement in the
direction opposite to the bias, while the others perceived the
correct direction. They discussed these group differences with
respect to the following two ways of action monitoring: First,
reliance on implicit central monitoring of mismatches results
from a comparison between the predicted sensory consequence
based on the motor commands and the actual consequence
(Held, 1961; Wolpert et al., 1995). Second, coinciding the felt
position of the arm with the biased visual feedback cancels
out the conflict (Harris, 1963). Fourneret and Jeannerod’s
participants, who were not perturbed by the biased visual
feedback, may have used the former way to a greater extent,
while the others may have relied more on the latter way.
Our participants, who did not show visuomotor temporal
recalibration, might have applied the former way, by strictly
monitoring the action and its sensory feedback. In our
experiment, proprioceptive feedback always matched the action,
while visual feedback was almost always mismatched (i.e.,
was delayed). Thus, they may have ignored visual feedback
that temporally mismatched the action in order not to attain
temporal recalibration. However, it still remains unclear whether
individuals use different ways to monitor the action involving
temporally mismatching feedback, and whether there are
individual differences in the temporal recalibration effect. Future
studies should examine these unresolved issues and find the
origin of individual differences, such as interoceptive sensitivity,
which predicts malleability of body ownership stemming from
multisensory stimulation (Tsakiris et al., 2011) and personality,
for instance, schizotypy, which can cause an altered prediction of
one’s own action (Asai and Tanno, 2007b; Asai et al., 2008).
Limitations
Our study has three limitations. First, we cannot say to what
degree visuomotor temporal recalibration occurred, since we did
not apply the method of constant stimuli to measure the shift
of point of subjective simultaneity, which has been traditionally
used in temporal recalibration studies (Fujisaki et al., 2004;
Vroomen et al., 2004; Stetson et al., 2006; Heron et al., 2009;
Keetels and Vroomen, 2012). Moreover, we could not examine
just noticeable differences indicating the temporal window of
the subjective simultaneity between multimodal stimuli affected
by temporal recalibration (Navarra et al., 2005; Winter et al.,
2008), especially when involving naturalistic feedback such as
hand video (Keetels and Vroomen, 2012). Although future study
should overcome this limitation, our methods allowed us to
examine the relationship between agency and body ownership
under virtually the same temporal-recalibrated situation, by
using the common procedure with a long-term adaptation phase
to induce recalibration and illusory body ownership.
Second, voluntary hand action itself may have affected
temporal recalibration. Observers can perceive a shortened
duration of the interval between voluntary action and its
outcome, so-called ‘‘intentional binding’’, which can serve as
an implicit measure of sense of agency (Haggard et al., 2002;
Engbert et al., 2007; Moore and Obhi, 2012). In the present study,
participants’ voluntary hand actionmay have entailed intentional
binding to some extent. Furthermore, natural visual feedback
of one’s hand action (i.e., the hand video) may have provided
a potential cue for perceiving agency and increased intentional
binding. Consequently, the perceived discrepancy between the
hand action and the video may have been lessened. If so, it can
be assumed that there was difficulty in ensuring that visuomotor
temporal recalibration emerged. Keetels and Vroomen (2012)
also discussed this, with their results showing a large proportion
of ‘‘synchronous’’ responses to physically delayed visual feedback
of finger taps in terms of intentional binding.
Finally, care should be taken to interpret our results by
measuring only explicit agency (i.e., rating) and implicit body
ownership (i.e., proprioceptive drift), since explicit and implicit
measures do not necessarily coincide (Shimada et al., 2009;
Rohde et al., 2011; Braun et al., 2014). For instance, under certain
conditions, feeling of agency and intentional binding (implicit
agency) cannot necessarily correlate (Braun et al., 2014), and
a body ownership questionnaire can detect the emergence of
illusory body-ownership, even when proprioceptive drift does
not occur (Shimada et al., 2009). On the other hand, using both
explicit and implicit measures of agency and body ownership,
previous studies have suggested that other types of dissociation
are caused by spatial factors and motor commands (Kalckert
and Ehrsson, 2012; Braun et al., 2014). It would be beneficial if
both agency and body ownership were measured explicitly and
implicitly. However, we did not find any implicit measurement
of agency (e.g., intentional binding paradigm: Haggard et al.,
2002) suitable for the current experiment inducing temporal
recalibration. Thus, our findings are limited to the specific case
where explicit agency and implicit body ownership aremeasured.
Future research should explore the explicit and implicit aspects of
the dissociation between agency and body ownership following
temporal recalibration by resolving the methodological issues
mentioned above.
Conclusion and Outlook
In conclusion, our results indicated that temporal recalibration
between voluntary action and the asynchronous hand-video
image entailed a sense of agency over the hand image but
did not elicit body ownership toward the hand image. We
suggest that the dissociation between agency and body ownership
might be due to different sensitivities for generating agency and
body ownership. Future studies should examine the interaction
between time perception and bodily self-consciousness in other
modalities, such as in the auditory domain (i.e., vocalization)
and in clinical populations, especially in people with phantom
limb pain following amputation (Ramachandran and Hirstein,
1998). Both sense of agency (Cole et al., 2009) and ownership
(Lenggenhager et al., 2014) over a prosthesis and virtual limb can
play a key role in alleviating pain. Given that the sensorimotor
mechanism for generating agency over an online hand image
remains for the phantom limb (Imaizumi et al., 2014), further
investigation would allow us to uncover the mechanism of
embodiment to the external proxies.
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